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Domestic Patenting Systems and Foreign Licensing Choices 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A patent allows the inventor for a certain period of time during which he is entitled to 
manage the diffusion of his invention. Patenting, therefore, serves as an incentive for 
innovation when, in particular, the inventor can reap the fruit of his investment in 
R&D. Generally, the innovator can realize a profit on the research outcome either 
from his filing for the patent or through the licensing of the patent. In the case of 
patent licensing, the most frequently observed types of contract include fixed fee, per 
unit royalty and/or a combination of fixed fee and royalties (see, for example, San 
Martin and Saracho, 2010; Vishwasrao, 2007).  
As a major seller of technology, the United States accounts for roughly 50% of 
world revenue of royalty and license fee (World Development Indicators, 2010). The 
multinational corporations (MNC) with US origin have been the key channels of 
transfer for technical know-how, industrial processes and computer software. 
Empirical evidence has shown that two-thirds of royalties and license receipts come 
from intra-firm transactions and approximately 60% of total trade within U.S. 
multinationals trade in intermediate inputs (The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
2004).  
It is often believed that a weaker patenting1 regime in the domestic country is 
harmful for the business interests of foreign innovative licensor. This occurs due to 
knowledge spillovers that increase domestic competition, reduce price and raise 
welfare of the licensee country. Despite this theoretical underpinning, domestic 
imitation in some developing countries is often acquiesced so long as it does not 
discourage foreign innovation. In the light of substantial business losses of US 
                                                 
1 In this paper, the terms of “patenting” and “intellectual property protection” are used interchangeably. 
 2 
multinationals due to inadequate protection of IPRs abroad, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) amended in 1994 the Special 301 provisions of the Trade Act 
of 1974.2  Special 301 was regarded as a success after Brazil had agreed to the 
immediate implementation of the TRIPS provisions without resorting to the transition 
period permitted to the developing nations (Doane, 1994). 
This paper examines a foreign inventor’s choices of two licensing schemes – 
per unit royalty and fixed fee. In particular, the foreign licensor decides the quality of 
licensed technology when the domestic country does not implement perfect 
intellectual property protection for foreign technology. 3  In the present context of 
licensing, the domestic licensee acquires foreign technology in terms of its level of 
technological advancement. The closer the licensed technology level approximates its 
“state-of-the-art” (or the frontier) one, the better the quality. We study quality choice 
as the foreign licensor’s selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show, 
for both a weak and a strong patenting system in the domestic country, that a foreign 
licensor, under the fixed fee scheme, always transfer the “state-of-the-art” technology 
to the domestic licensee when the efficiency of such transfer is sufficiently high. We 
further show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both 
the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost 
competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We 
also investigate the welfare implications of domestic patenting system for the foreign 
innovator’s licensing policy. And we show that welfare in the licensor country need 
not unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, 
                                                 
2 This requires USTR to identify as the “priority watch list” foreign countries that deny adequate and 
effective protection of IPRs, or fair and equitable market access for U.S. persons that rely on IP 
protection. Indeed, The USTR has requested and received submissions from U.S. industries suggesting 
that several nations be included on priority, priority watch, and watch lists. These submissions include 
many of the nations, which opposed the TRIPS negotiations and putting it into force, such as India and 
Brazil. 
3 See Kabiraj and Marjit (1993), Maskus (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001) and Amir et al. (2011) for 
the impacts on licensing schemes under weak and strong patent system, respectively. 
 3 
in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.  
The novelty of our paper is that domestic patenting system impacts on the 
foreign inventor’s licensing decisions through endogenous quality choice.4 We argue, 
in addition to the strategic effects on host market competition, that there exist trade-
offs while deciding the licensing modes. We investigate the role that per unit royalty5 
plays, in particular, under weak domestic patenting regime in facilitating the 
endogenous choice of an exact quality level of foreign licensed technology (cf. 
Vishwasrao, 2007; Amir et al., 2011; Colombo and Filippini, 2016). This paper, 
however, is not the first to explore the quality of licensed technology in a licensing 
agreement. This formulation is closest to Rockett (1990) who considers that a licensor 
can choose from his patent a particular vintage of the technological profile and the 
structure of payment (i.e., licensing scheme).   
This paper differs from previous works in three aspects. First, our paper marks 
a subtle distinction between the quality choice of technology and process innovation.6 
Process innovation does not involve a payment from the competing firms. And if it is 
subsequently used for production, e.g., in a cost reduction manner, by the licensee, the 
quality being transferred from the licensor captures specifically the impact on the 
extent to which the licensee’s cost is reduced. Our handling of this issue departs from 
the general setup in which the nature of licensed technology is a cost-reducing one”. 7  
Second, this model links directly the quality of licensed technology to the efficiency-
adjusted technology transfer cost that is borne by the licensor, while Rockett (1990) 
                                                 
4 Mukherjee and Tsai (2015) consider optimal quality choice of licensed technology under perfect 
patenting. And Amir et al. (2011) examine licensing schemes in a weak patent system when a patent 
might be invalidated if challenged in court. 
5 In an interesting contribution, Colombo and Filippini (2016) study different licensing schemes and 
compare two-part tariff to both schemes of ad valorem royalty contracts and revenue-royalty contracts, 
where the price, rather than the quantity, is the basis of the licensing contract. 
6 The authors thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a clarification on the linkage between quality 
choice and cost-reducing technology. 
7 See, for example, Wang (1998), Sinha (2010), and San Martin and Saracho (2010). These papers 
consider merely the transfer of cost-reducing technology in licensing contract without exploring the 
role that quality choice plays in affecting the mode of technology licensing.  
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approximates “costly transfer” to the extreme case of “no imitation” of technology, 
Mukherjee and Tsai (2015) consider costly transfer which involves both a fixed and 
an adjustment cost in transferring technology, and Yang et al. (2016) examines 
optimal licensing schemes under Nash bargaining setting without integral linkages of 
technology quality to the cost of its transfer. And third, the present model considers 
that the patenting system in the licensee country is exogenously given and directly 
affects in a multiplicative manner the licensee’s marginal cost ex post licensing, while 
Yang et al. (2016, pp. 240-241) consider endogenous domestic IPRs regime in the 
licensee country and separate, in an additive manner, the spillovers effect (which 
arises from the different strengths of IPRs in the licensee country) from the quality 
effect (which holds when different grades of foreign technology directly affect the 
licensee’s cost). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic 
model. Section 3 discusses the main results and their implications. And Section 4 
concludes. 
2. The basic model 
We consider a world economy with two countries, foreign and domestic. Each 
country has one firm, denoted by 1 and 2, respectively. Assume that firm 1 is foreign 
and firm 2 domestic. In the domestic market, the two firms compete a la Cournot with 
a homogeneous product. Firm 1 holds patents for its technology profile that is 
captured by a range of marginal cost over [0, c]. Nonetheless, firm 1 can choose any 
level of quality, s, from the technology set [0, c] and license to firm 2. Hence, firm 1 
determines both quality of the licensed technology and the payment structure. For 
analytical simplicity, we shall consider that firm 1 uses the “state-of-the-art” (or the 
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frontier) technology and produces at zero marginal cost, while firm 2 produces at 
some positive marginal cost of c prior to licensing. 
We consider two types of domestic patenting regime, namely, weak patenting 
(WP henceforth) and strong patenting (SP henceforth). Under WP, imitation (or 
reverse engineering) allows for spillovers to the domestic firm of the foreign technical 
know-how. Hence, for any weak domestic patenting system, the marginal cost of firm 
2 is c , where 1]0,(  captures the strength of patenting system in the licensee 
country. The greater the value of  , the stronger the domestic IPRs system. In the 
extreme of a strong patent protection (SP), the marginal cost of domestic firm 2 is 
given by c and, thus, imitation does not take place (that is, 1 ). We assume, in the 
case of imitation, that the licensor (firm 1) cannot collect royalty for the licensee’s 
(firm 2’s) production. This key feature of our model reflects that both fixed-fee (F) 
and per unit royalty (R) licensing are available under SP in the domestic country, that 
only the fixed fee licensing (F) is feasible under WP in the licensee country8 and that 
a two-part tariff licensing collapses into a fixed-fee one under WP. 
In order to highlight the impact of the patenting regime in the licensee country 
on the foreign firm’s licensing policy, we study the licensing schemes of fixed-fee (F) 
and royalty (R) under both WP and SP, respectively. We investigate the subgame 
perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome of licensing contract (F vs. R) and the quality of 
licensed technology under each licensing scheme ( Fs and Rs ). And we summarize the 
licensing game with different IPRs strengths in the licensee country as follows. First, 
foreign licensor decides the quality of licensed technology s. Given the quality choice 
of licensed technology, foreign firm 1 then sets the licensing payment structure by a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer of licensing contract, domestic licensee accepts if it is not 
worse off than no licensing, and rejects otherwise. Finally, the two firms engage in 
                                                 
8 Put differently, a weak domestic patenting implies the licensee’s output ex post licensing is not 
observable and, thus, royalty licensing is not feasible under WP. 
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Cournot competition by setting quantity in the domestic markets. The payoffs to the 
two firms are their profits. The inverse demand function is given by qP 1 , where 
P is price and q is the total output sold. We solve the game through the method of 
backward induction.  
Clearly, foreign firm 1 first selects the quality of its licensed technology s, 
where [0, ]s c  under WP and [0, ]s c  under SP. Higher s suggests a better quality 
of technology being transferred and, thus, implies a lower marginal cost of firm 2 ex 
post licensing. In the extreme of s = 0, firm 1 does not license any of its technology 
since reduction of marginal cost does not occur under either WP or SP. Further, when 
firm 1 transfers the best of its technology, we have s c  under WP and s c  under 
SP. We consider that technology transfer involves a total cost 2/)( 2ssC  , where γ 
is an inverse measurement of transfer efficiency for a particular quality of the licensed 
technology. Since the licensor solely incurs such cost, a higher γ reflects a lower level 
of efficiency in transferring technology and vice versa when the transfer efficiency is 
interpreted as the licensee’s capacity in absorbing outside knowledge or the legal 
restraints in either country of the licensor or the licensee. Real world observation9 
suggests that there are costs involved in setting enforceable contact terms and shifting 
codified knowledge when, in particular, the licensed technologies require further 
modification in accordance with the licensee’s technological capacity.  
2.1. Benchmark  
Before studying the firm’s interactions under licensing, we first consider the profits of 
the firms under no licensing. This allows us to establish the reservation payoffs as the 
benchmark for the licensing contract.  
                                                 
9 It is well documented that technology licensing requires significant amount of transaction costs 
(Teece, 1976; Taylor, 1993; Yang and Maskus, 2009).  
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Under no licensing, the marginal costs of firms 1 and 2 are, respectively, 0 and 
c  under WP, and 0 and c under SP since 1 . Hence, the profit of firm 1 and firm 
2 is, respectively, given by  
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To ensure interior solution of the licensing game, we restrict our analysis to 2/1c  
for any ]1,0(  so that the firms always produce positive outputs. 
2.2 Fixed-fee licensing under WP and SP  
We first consider the case of a fixed-fee licensing. Under WP, for any 
technology of quality [0, ]s c , competition in the output stage gives, respectively, 
the equilibrium profit of firm 1 and firm 2 as  
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where F is the fixed-fee charged by firm 1.10  
Clearly, the licensee (firm 2) accepts the licensing contract provided that the 
equilibrium fixed-fee being charged leaves non-negative rent for participation, i.e., 
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10 In the output stage, the cost of transferring technology is sunk and, thus, has no effect on the 
equilibrium fixed licensing fee. 
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The SPE outcome of quality for the licensor’s technology under fixed-fee licensing is 
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where the denominator 9 10 0    is obtained from the second-order condition. This 
condition ensures that Equation (5) is concave in s, which allows us to bring out the 
main message and analytical simplicity in the present analysis.11  
 Proposition 1 summarizes foreign firm’s licensing decision under fixed-fee 
licensing in the presence of weak patenting system in the licensee country.  
Proposition 1: Given a weak patenting (WP) system in the licensee country, i.e., 
]1,0( , foreign licensor (firm 1)  
(a) conducts fixed-fee licensing when either the licensee is not sufficiently cost 
competitive (i.e., 5/1c ) or the domestic patenting regime in place is already 
sufficiently strong (i.e., c5/1 ); and  
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Under fixed fee licensing and given the intermediate technology transfer 
efficiency ( 9/10 ), Equation (6) implies that foreign licensor’s decision rests upon 
the trade-off between the licensee’s cost competitiveness (c) and the strength of 
domestic patenting system ( ]1,0( ).12  Intuitively, the strength of domestic IPRs 
system ( 1 ) impacts on the licensor’s cost advantage against that of the licensee 
and, therefore, the rent accrued to the licensor under fixed-fee licensing. For any 
                                                 
11 Elsewhere, we explicit investigate the case of 0109   and show that the licensor’s profit is 
convex in its choice of technology quality (see the discussion in Mukherjee and Tsai (2015, p. 68)). 
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selected quality of the licensed technology, foreign licensor alone incurs total cost of 
technology transfer and such cost moves inversely with the technology transfer 
efficiency (  ). If   reflects the degree of convexity associated with the licensor’s 
total technology transfer cost, then a lower   is equivalent to a higher technology 
transfer efficiency. Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 provides the background for 
sketching Table 1 and Figure 1 with the relevant parameter values of technology 
transfer efficiency ( ), the cost competitiveness between the licensor and the licensee 
( c ) under a weak domestic patenting system )5/1( c .13   
We sketch, in Table 1, the equilibrium quality of licensed technology ( FWs ) 
subject to the interactions among  , c  and  , where c5/1 .    
Table 1.  csFW  , 
 
9/10  and 
5
1
9
2
 c

 
F
Ws    
       FWs c     
  c     c     c  
0.131 1.45 0.3 0.53  0.5 0.32  0.7 0.22 
0.098 1.45 0.3 0.56  0.5 0.34  0.7 0.24 
0.065 1.45 0.3 0.6  0.5 0.36  0.7 0.25 
0.052 1.95 0.3 0.53  0.5 0.32  0.7 0.22 
0.039 1.95 0.3 0.56  0.5 0.34  0.7 0.24 
0.026 1.95 0.3 0.6  0.5 0.36  0.7 0.25 
0.042 2.15 0.3 0.53  0.5 0.32  0.7 0.22 
0.032 2.15 0.3 0.56  0.5 0.34  0.7 0.24 
0.021 2.15 0.3 0.6  0.5 0.36  0.7 0.25 
 
Figure 1 illustrates, based upon Table 1, the SPE outcome of equilibrium 
quality of the licensed technology under fixed fee in the presence of weak domestic 
patenting. Notice that the equilibrium quality of licensed technology FWs  falls with a 
greater value of  , where   is an arbitrary number satisfying 9/10  and 45.1   
95.1'  and 15.2''  . 
                                                 
13 The authors thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a graphical presentation with numerical 
example for better presentation of the results.  
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Figure 1 Weak Patenting ( 1 ) with 45.1 , 95.1'  and 15.2''   
With strong patenting system (SP) in the licensee country (i.e., 1 ), we 
summarize in Corollary 1 the equilibrium scheme of fixed-fee licensing.  
Corollary 1: Given a strong patenting (SP) in the licensee country, i.e., 1 , foreign 
licensor (firm 1)  
(a) conducts a fixed-fee scheme only if the licensee produces at sufficiently low 
marginal cost, i.e., 5/1c ; and 
(b) transfers (i) the “state-of-the-art” (or the best) quality of technology csFF  if the 
efficiency of technology transfer is sufficiently high (i.e., 
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9
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Proof. For similar derivation, see Mukherjee and Tsai (2015, pp. 67-8). 
Table 2 summarizes the equilibrium quality of licensed technology ( FSs ) 
contained in Corollary 1 under strong patenting )1(   for any technology transfer 
efficiency ( ), the cost competitiveness between the licensor and the licensee ( c ). 
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Table 2. csFS  , 9/10 , 1  and 
5
1
9
2
 c

 
F
Ss    
  ( =1)FSs c    
c  
0.16 1.25 0.18 
0.12 1.25 0.185 
0.08 1.25 0.19 
0.05 1.55 0.18 
0.037 1.55 0.185 
0.025 1.55 0.19 
0.026 1.95 0.18 
0.019 1.95 0.185 
0.013 1.95 0.19 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the intuitive explanation of this result, which follows 
through the same argument, except that 1  here, as stated in that for Proposition 1. 
 
Figure 2 Strong Patenting ( 1 ) with 25.1 , 55.1'  and 95.1''   
It is worth highlighting that the nature of technology transfer and the context 
to which it is applied have important implications. Comparing technology transfer in 
the present model to that in Colombo and Filippini (2016), we note the following 
differences: foreign licensor solely incurs the cost of technology transfer, which is an 
efficiency-adjusted (quadratic) function of technology quality (s), while technology 
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transfer in Colombo and Filippini (2016) relates directly with total output (p. 50). In 
line with the interpretation of   in the present model, if we interpret the technology 
parameter k in Colombo and Filippini (2016, pp. 50, 66) as an inverse measurement of 
the quality of technology subsequent to its innovation, then their characterization 
suggests that an inside innovator’s total production cost falls with a higher technology 
quality (i.e., a smaller value of k).  
2.3 Royalty licensing  
We now examine foreign licensor’s decision under royalty licensing. The licensing 
game under per-unit royalty scheme is summarized as follow. Foreign licensor first 
chooses the quality of licensed technology. Given the chosen quality, foreign licensor 
proposes the domestic licensee a royalty contract specifying the per-unit royalty rate 
and the quality. The licensee accepts this royalty contract if it is not worse off than no 
licensing, and rejects otherwise. The two firms finally compete in the domestic output 
market. Notice that foreign licensor (firm 1) cannot collect royalty for the licensee’s 
(firm 2’s) production since imitation is possible under weak domestic patenting, it 
follows that royalty licensing can be implemented only under SP, and that it is not 
feasible under WP. 
To find the SPE outcome of optimal quality of licensed technology, we first 
solve, under royalty licensing, for the equilibrium output in the market. It is easy to 
verify that the equilibrium profit of firm 1 and 2, respectively, is  
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Given the strong patenting system in the licensee country, foreign firm 1 
decides the quality [0, ]s c  of its technology for solving Equation (7) subject to  
 13 
0
3
))((1
)(
2
2
11 




 

rsc
qRR  and 0
3
))((21
)(
2
2
22 




 

rsc
qRR , (IR) 
SPunder
cNLR
9
)21( 2
22

                 (IC) 
Clearly, individual rationality (IR) suggests that foreign licensor sets royalty 
rate *
5 4 4
10
c s
r
 
  to solve for Equation (7). Nevertheless, incentive compatibility 
(IC) implies, for any 0c  and 0r  , that the licensee’s marginal cost ex post 
licensing remains to be no smaller than the one prior to licensing in order to induce 
royalty licensing. Hence, we have established that r s . 14  This implies the 
equilibrium royalty is  
   *r s .15                       (9) 
 Finally, given the equilibrium royalty obtained in Equation (9), foreign 
licensor chooses at stage 1 the quality of licensed technology to solve for  
2 2
1
(1 ) 3 (1 2 )
9 2
R c s c s
  
  .                        (10) 
Substituting (9) into (10) and solve for the SPE outcome of quality for the 
licensed technology, we have  
     
1 2
3
R cs


 .               (11) 
where 0Rs  for any 2/1c  and 0  due to the second-order condition. 
Proposition 2 summarizes foreign licensor’s choices of technology quality 
under royalty licensing scheme.  
                                                 
14 The licensee (firm 2) has no incentive to use the licensed technology if the ex-post licensing contract 
is such that crsc  )( . It follows that the constraint r s  must hold.    
15 The equilibrium royalty of 10/)445(* scr   is obtained from solving Equation (7). For any 
[0, ]s c  and 2/1c , it is easy to verify that sscr  10/)445(*  if and only if 
2/1s , and that 2/1s  violates [0, ]s c  and 2/1c . Hence, the royalty rate in equilibrium 
must bind and is, therefore, given by sr * . 
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Proposition 2 Given strong patenting (SP) in the licensee country, foreign firm 1  
(a) conducts royalty licensing if the licensee is relatively cost competitive (i.e., when 
its marginal cost is not too high, 2/1c ); and  
(b) transfers (i) the “state-of-the-art” (or the frontier) quality of its technology at 
csR   for any cc 3/)21(  , but (ii) not the best quality level of 
ccsR  3/)21(  for any cc 3/)21(  . 
Under royalty licensing, Proposition 2 suggests that foreign licensor always 
licenses its technology if the licensee is fairly cost competitive (i.e., 2/1c ) and that 
the best quality of his technology is licensed if the transfer efficiency is sufficiently 
high (i.e., cc 3/)21(  ). In the extreme of a very high level of efficiency in 
technology transfer, implying a negligible total technology transfer cost (when   
approximates 0), the best quality of technology is always transferred since the 
aggregate of firm 1’s profit and royalty revenue strictly increases with a higher level 
of quality s.16  
Table 3 summarizes the result contained in Proposition 2, given 2/1c   and 
cc 3/)21(  . 
Table 3 csR  , 2/1c  and cc 3/)21(   
Rs    c  
0.333 0.3 0.35 
0.222 0.3 0.4 
0.111 0.3 0.45 
0.166 0.6 0.35 
0.111 0.6 0.4 
0.055 0.6 0.45 
0.076 1.3 0.35 
0.051 1.3 0.4 
0.025 1.3 0.45 
 
Figure 3 shows, under royalty licensing, that the higher the value of  , the lower the 
quality of licensed technology, where   is an arbitrary number satisfying 
cc 3/)21(   for any 2/1c  and 0.3 , 6.0' and 3.1''  . 
                                                 
16  This is evident, from Equation (10), that 0/1  s
R  for any [0, ]s c  and 2/1c if   
approximates zero. 
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Figure 3 Strong patenting ( 1 ) with 0.3 , 6.0'  and 3.1''  . 
Notably, this result under royalty licensing is milder than that under fixed-fee 
licensing as characterized in Proposition 1. Intuitively, royalty licensing directly 
affects the licensee’s marginal cost,17 given the endogenously determined quality of 
licensed technology. Hence, royalty licensing can emerge as an equilibrium scheme 
only when the quality of licensed technology allows the licensee for sufficiently 
strong competitiveness. It is important to note, however, that the efficiency of 
technology transfer remains a key element of the quality choice of licensed 
technology.  
In Section 3, we shall compare and study the conditions under which fixed fee 
licensing or royalty licensing can emerge as an equilibrium scheme. We investigate 
foreign firm 1’s choices of the licensing scheme with reference to its profit under WP 
and SP in the licensee country, respectively. And we also study the welfare 
implications for foreign firm’s licensing choices of the domestic patenting systems. 
                                                 
17 Colombo and Filippini (2016) distinguish ad valorem royalty from revenue royalty and argue that 
“revenue royalty” allows the patentee for extracting a quota of the licensee’s revenues. 
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To this end, we restrict our discussion to any c and   such that 5/1c  under 
which both licensing schemes take place (cf. Propositions 1 and 2). 
3. The Main Results 
3.1 Domestic IPRs system and the equilibrium licensing schemes  
A qualitative comparison of the results contained, respectively, in Proposition 1, 
Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 indicates, under both licensing schemes, that the quality 
of technology at the “state-of-the-art” level is always licensed so long as the burden of 
making its technology available to the licensor is not too excessive and the licensee’s 
generic technology is not too much behind that of the licensor, which is captured by 
an insignificant cost differences between the licensor and the licensee. 
Next, under strong IPRs system in the licensee country, the constraints in 
which technology transfer takes place under royalty licensing is less restrictive than 
that under fixed-fee licensing. Indeed, under royalty licensing, 0Rs  for any 
2/1c ; and under fixed-fee licensing, 0Fs   if 5/1c . We note, under WP in the 
licensee country, that royalty licensing scheme is not an equilibrium strategy for the 
licensor due to possible imitation. Hence, we restrict our comparison of the two 
schemes under SP. Nonetheless, this key feature of our model justifies our analysis 
into fixed fee licensing and royalty licensing, in contrast to Mukherjee and Tsai 
(2015) and others. Our consideration of possible imitation taking place in the licensee 
country with weak IPRs system implies that a general model of two-part tariff 
licensing scheme collapses into a fixed-fee scheme. This consideration of linking 
domestic IPRs system with royalty licensing scheme through imitation allows for 
separation of our model from other previous ones. Consequently, royalty licensing 
and its applicability can serve as an indicator of the domestic patenting regime in the 
licensee country. 
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3.2 Equilibrium firm profits under two licensing schemes 
For any domestic patenting system in the licensee country, Propositions 1 and 
2 and Corollary 1 suggest that net profit of foreign licensor (firm 1) and domestic 
licensee (firm 2) under fixed-fee licensing is, respectively, given by  
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Using Proposition 2, it is easy to show, under royalty licensing, that the net 
profit of firm 1 and 2 is, respectively, given by  
 

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Proposition 3 below characterizes the conditions under which fixed-fee 
emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme under SP in the licensee country. 
Proposition 3 In the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), foreign licensor adopts (i) 
fixed-fee licensing when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient 
(
cc
c
9
2
3
21
9
10


  ) and the licensee is sufficiently competitive in the domestic 
market ( 16/36/1  c ); and (ii) royalty licensing, otherwise.  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
 18 
Intuitively, even though a strong patenting in the licensee country may 
safeguard the licensor’s business interests, the licensor’s decisions rest upon the trade-
offs between his cost advantage against that of the licensee and the burden of 
technology transfer costs, which, in turn, fall with a higher level of efficiency. Using 
Equations (12c), it is evident, under fixed-fee licensing, that the licensee (firm 2) 
secures a higher profit in the presence of weak domestic patenting regime, and that 
the licensee’s profit under fixed-fee licensing in the presence of strong domestic IPRs 
equals to that is obtained under royalty (cf. Equation (12c) and (13c)). Notice, 
however, that a weak domestic IPRs system prevents the licensor from engaging in 
royalty licensing. It is, therefore, illegitimate to compare the licensee’s equilibrium 
profit under royalty to that is established under fixed-fee in the presence of weak 
domestic patenting regime.18  
3.3 Domestic welfare in the licensee country  
We have shown, using Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, that domestic welfare in the 
licensee country under fixed-fee licensing with weak patenting (denoted by FWW ) and 
that with strong patenting (denoted by FSW ) is, respectively, given by   
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18 The authors thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
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Intuitively, fixed-fee licensing implies foreign licensor extracts the entire rent if it 
decides to license on the one hand, and domestic licensee only produces if the quality 
of the licensed technology allows for its competition in the domestic market on the 
other. It follows that a weaker domestic patenting system gives rise to a higher welfare in 
the licensee country under fixed-fee licensing regardless the efficiency of technology 
transfer since consumer surplus in the licensee country rises when both firms produce 
in the southern market.  
Further, using Proposition 2, it is evident that the welfare in the licensee’s 
country under royalty licensing is 
18
)2()21(2 22 cc
W R

  irrespective of the 
efficiency of technology transfer. An intuitive explanation for this result can be 
provided as follows. Under royalty licensing, the quality of licensed technology is 
chosen to be commensurate with royalty per unit of the licensee’s output. In 
equilibrium, the quality of licensed technology ought to be chosen in a way such that 
the licensee’s cost ex post licensing allows for its participation in the output market 
while the patenting system in the licensee country can affect no longer the equilibrium 
profit and, thus, domestic welfare. 
In order to bring out the main message of our analysis, we focus on the 
implication of strong vs. weak domestic IPRs system in the licensee country for the 
welfare in the licensor country. Proposition 4 below summarizes our analysis for the 
impact of domestic patenting system on foreign welfare. 
Proposition 4 With endogenous choice of the quality for licensed technology, welfare 
in the licensor’s country need not unambiguously rise with stronger domestic IPRs in 
the licensee country. More precisely, welfare in the licensor’s country falls with the 
strength of domestic IPRs if such system in place is already sufficiently lax (i.e., 
 ~ ) and rises with it otherwise (i.e.,  ~ ). 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
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In the presence of endogenous quality choice, technology licensing takes place 
whenever the rent to foreign licensor generating from such agreement outweighs the 
losses in outputs under weak domestic patenting system in the licensee country.19 This 
suggests, if the efficiency of technology transfer (as captured by the slope of the 
marginal cost of technology transfer) is sufficiently high and the primary cost 
differences between the firms are sufficiently small, that a weaker IPRs in the licensee 
country need not always hamper welfare of the licensor country under fixed fee 
licensing. Indeed, if the efficiency of technology transfer is high, foreign licensor can 
easily license technology of higher grade (or better quality) to licensee under fixed-fee 
licensing. Under such circumstance, the higher net profit of the licensor under fixed 
fee licensing allows for a relatively beneficial effect of the consumers surplus in the 
licensee country and, thus, leads to a greater domestic welfare under fixed fee 
licensing. 
4. Conclusion 
We investigate the impact of domestic patenting regime on a foreign licensor’s 
decisions over technology quality and optimal licensing scheme, in contrast to the 
early patenting literature wherein welfare implications of patenting have been the 
focal point. While attempting to contribute to the extant literature, we examine 
licensing decision with endogenous choice over the quality of licensed technology. 
We consider its closeness to the “state-of-the-art” level as the quality of licensed 
technology. We use the strength of domestic patenting systems in the licensee country 
                                                 
19 This is evident from the unambiguously negative impact on licensor’s output of a lax domestic IPRs 
system, i.e., 0)(
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as an equivalent to the possibility of imitation ex post licensing. And we separate the 
domestic IPRs system in the licensee country into the categories of weak patenting 
and strong patenting under both fixed fee licensing and royalty licensing. Our 
treatment that weak domestic patenting in the licensee country excludes foreign 
licensor from implementing royalty licensing facilitates the features of our model, 
namely, weak patenting in the domestic market pre-conditions the threat of 
competition from the licensor and, thus, constrains the ‘quality’ of licensed 
technology that can be chosen. This formulation allows for the linkages between 
intellectual property protection regime and licensing decisions on the one hand, and 
the endogenous choice of licensed technology quality under different licensing 
schemes on the other. Our analysis has shown that fixed fee emerges as the 
equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively 
efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and 
that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. This qualitative aspect of transferring “state-
of-the-art” technology holds for both strong and weak IPRs system in the licensee 
country. We have also shown, under royalty licensing, that the best quality of its 
technology is licensed provided the efficiency of technology transfer is sufficient high 
and the domestic IPRs regime in the licensee country is sufficiently strong. 
 For the possible avenue of future research, it is worth emphasizing that 
interesting insights can be provided to the extant literature as to whether quality 
choice of the licensed technology can be functioned as a cost-reducing technology20 
or whether new result can be obtained if it is alternatively formulated as a demand 
enhancing element21, despite that royalties is not directly associated with price in 
Colombo and Filippini (2016) and our paper focuses on the endogenous quality 
choice for any given strength of the domestic IPRs system.  
                                                 
20 The authors thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
21 See Levhari and Peles (1973) for a justification on this characterization. 
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To conclude, we have identified licensing through endogenous quality choice 
of licensed technology as the main channel, in contrast to those considered in the 
literature such as economies of scale and entry mode choices. This important insight 
can provide licensee’s government in formulating intellectual property policy 
prescriptions while inducing the frontier technology from the licensor.   
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Appendix A 
Notice, under a strong patenting system in the licensee country, that fixed-fee 
licensing emerges as the equilibrium scheme if and only if RF 11   . Using Equations 
(12a) - (12c) and (13a) - (13c), it is easy to verify, for any of the following conditions: 
(i) 
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To prove the result contained in Proposition 3, we sketch our proof by contradiction 
and proceed in three steps. 
Proof. First, given the SPE outcome of Fs and Rs , we rewrite Z as 
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and we note that Z consists of three terms  ,   and  , where    is strictly positive 
and   is nonnegative if 0 RF ss . Hence, Z is strictly positive provided that   is 
non-negative. It is evident, for any 0 RF ss , that  is strictly positive if and only 
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Rewriting Equation (A-2), we have 
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Appendix B 
Welfare in the licensor’s country is now simplified to FFNW 1 . Using Equations (5) 
and (6), we differentiate F1 with respect to   and obtain that  
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Using the results contained in Propositions 1 and 2, we have  
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